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  <title>asgaard</title>
  <description>Security</description>
  <link>https://blog.asgaard.co.uk/t/security</link>
  <lastBuildDate>Thu, 23 Apr 26 05:21:02 +0000</lastBuildDate>
  <language>en</language>
  <count>2</count>
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      <item>
    <title>Peripheral vision and security</title>
    <link>https://blog.asgaard.co.uk/2014/12/02/peripheral-vision-and-security</link>
    <pubDate>Tue, 02 Dec 14 18:46:25 +0000</pubDate>
    <guid>https://blog.asgaard.co.uk/2014/12/02/peripheral-vision-and-security</guid>
    <description><![CDATA[
<p>
Here&#039;s a bug report from the Composer project: <a href="https://github.com/composer/getcomposer.org/issues/76">https://github.com/composer/getcomposer.org/issues/76</a>
<p>
The report (rudely, but) correctly, points out that the recommended way of installing the script, by getting it via curl and piping it into an interpreter, is a security risk in the event that the source gets hacked and starts serving malicious code. That&#039;s true - I agree.
<p>
But hang on a minute, Composer is a package manager for a programming language. The whole point of Composer is that you download other people&#039;s code and then include it straight into some executable of your own! You could literally be pulling in 50 different packages, each of which suffers from the exact same vulnerability - if the source is compromised, you are executing very untrusted code (instead of merely <em>we&#039;ll trust it because it&#039;s convenient</em> code).
<p>
I&#039;m not saying you shouldn&#039;t use package managers, nor am I saying that signing scripts/executables is a bad thing, but I am saying you should be a b[...]]]></description>
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<p>
Here&#039;s a bug report from the Composer project: <a href="https://github.com/composer/getcomposer.org/issues/76">https://github.com/composer/getcomposer.org/issues/76</a>
<p>
The report (rudely, but) correctly, points out that the recommended way of installing the script, by getting it via curl and piping it into an interpreter, is a security risk in the event that the source gets hacked and starts serving malicious code. That&#039;s true - I agree.
<p>
But hang on a minute, Composer is a package manager for a programming language. The whole point of Composer is that you download other people&#039;s code and then include it straight into some executable of your own! You could literally be pulling in 50 different packages, each of which suffers from the exact same vulnerability - if the source is compromised, you are executing very untrusted code (instead of merely <em>we&#039;ll trust it because it&#039;s convenient</em> code).
<p>
I&#039;m not saying you shouldn&#039;t use package managers, nor am I saying that signing scripts/executables is a bad thing, but I am saying you should be a bit sensible about evaluating security risks.]]></content:encoded>
  </item>
      <item>
    <title>What is Indy Library?</title>
    <link>https://blog.asgaard.co.uk/2012/10/12/what-is-indy-library</link>
    <pubDate>Fri, 12 Oct 12 16:43:21 +0000</pubDate>
    <guid>https://blog.asgaard.co.uk/2012/10/12/what-is-indy-library</guid>
    <description><![CDATA[
<p>
Browsing my logs, I see a bot with the user agent &quot;Mozilla/3.0 (compatible; Indy Library)&quot; doing some pretty interesting things. 
<p>
It appears to be a distributed bot which dictionary attacks login forms. That is to say, it attempts to hack your site. It&#039;s (incorrectly) identified mine as Wordpress, but maybe it attacks other CMSs too.
<p>
I have a honeypot set up to make this site look like Wordpress which logs login attempts. You can <a href='/logins.txt' target='_blank' rel='nofollow'>see the results of this here</a>, the Indy Library bot is the first to take the bait and is currently filling up the data quite quickly (although not excessively).
<p>
It&#039;s using a whole bunch of different IPs:
<p>
217.128.175.91
<br>
80.35.16.63
<br>
188.13.39.226
<br>
64.61.155.42
<br>
90.182.73.81
<br>
71.224.57.62
<br>
212.183.165.15
<br>
80.59.98.59
<br>
2.112.195.83
<p>
But instead of using the IPs, as it identifies itself via user agent, you can block it easily with an .htaccess rule
<p>
<pre>RewriteCond %{HTTP_USER_AGENT} Indy\ Library [NC]
RewriteRule .* - [F]</pre>[...]]]></description>
    <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>
Browsing my logs, I see a bot with the user agent &quot;Mozilla/3.0 (compatible; Indy Library)&quot; doing some pretty interesting things. 
<p>
It appears to be a distributed bot which dictionary attacks login forms. That is to say, it attempts to hack your site. It&#039;s (incorrectly) identified mine as Wordpress, but maybe it attacks other CMSs too.
<p>
I have a honeypot set up to make this site look like Wordpress which logs login attempts. You can <a href='/logins.txt' target='_blank' rel='nofollow'>see the results of this here</a>, the Indy Library bot is the first to take the bait and is currently filling up the data quite quickly (although not excessively).
<p>
It&#039;s using a whole bunch of different IPs:
<p>
217.128.175.91
<br>
80.35.16.63
<br>
188.13.39.226
<br>
64.61.155.42
<br>
90.182.73.81
<br>
71.224.57.62
<br>
212.183.165.15
<br>
80.59.98.59
<br>
2.112.195.83
<p>
But instead of using the IPs, as it identifies itself via user agent, you can block it easily with an .htaccess rule
<p>
<pre>RewriteCond %{HTTP_USER_AGENT} Indy\ Library [NC]
RewriteRule .* - [F]</pre>]]></content:encoded>
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