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  <title>asgaard</title>
  <description></description>
  <link>https://blog.asgaard.co.uk/2014/12/02/peripheral-vision-and-security</link>
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    <title>Peripheral vision and security</title>
    <link>https://blog.asgaard.co.uk/2014/12/02/peripheral-vision-and-security</link>
    <pubDate>Tue, 02 Dec 14 18:46:25 +0000</pubDate>
    <guid>https://blog.asgaard.co.uk/2014/12/02/peripheral-vision-and-security</guid>
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<p>
Here&#039;s a bug report from the Composer project: <a href="https://github.com/composer/getcomposer.org/issues/76">https://github.com/composer/getcomposer.org/issues/76</a>
<p>
The report (rudely, but) correctly, points out that the recommended way of installing the script, by getting it via curl and piping it into an interpreter, is a security risk in the event that the source gets hacked and starts serving malicious code. That&#039;s true - I agree.
<p>
But hang on a minute, Composer is a package manager for a programming language. The whole point of Composer is that you download other people&#039;s code and then include it straight into some executable of your own! You could literally be pulling in 50 different packages, each of which suffers from the exact same vulnerability - if the source is compromised, you are executing very untrusted code (instead of merely <em>we&#039;ll trust it because it&#039;s convenient</em> code).
<p>
I&#039;m not saying you shouldn&#039;t use package managers, nor am I saying that signing scripts/executables is a bad thing, but I am saying you should be a b[...]]]></description>
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<p>
Here&#039;s a bug report from the Composer project: <a href="https://github.com/composer/getcomposer.org/issues/76">https://github.com/composer/getcomposer.org/issues/76</a>
<p>
The report (rudely, but) correctly, points out that the recommended way of installing the script, by getting it via curl and piping it into an interpreter, is a security risk in the event that the source gets hacked and starts serving malicious code. That&#039;s true - I agree.
<p>
But hang on a minute, Composer is a package manager for a programming language. The whole point of Composer is that you download other people&#039;s code and then include it straight into some executable of your own! You could literally be pulling in 50 different packages, each of which suffers from the exact same vulnerability - if the source is compromised, you are executing very untrusted code (instead of merely <em>we&#039;ll trust it because it&#039;s convenient</em> code).
<p>
I&#039;m not saying you shouldn&#039;t use package managers, nor am I saying that signing scripts/executables is a bad thing, but I am saying you should be a bit sensible about evaluating security risks.]]></content:encoded>
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